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CHAPTER 7
PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION
Introduction to Chapter 7
In Chapter 4, drawing on Johnson’s (1996) generic polarity of ADoing/Being@ (p. 221), I identified
both polarities of meaning (where the meanings are opposites) and polarities of function (where one
polarity is the means by which the other polarity is achieved). Thus, I have presented freedomauthority, diversity-equality, and human rights-communal obligations as polarities of meaning while I
have labeled justice-due-process as a polarity of function. However, I believe the polarity of
participation and representation represents a hybrid of a polarity of meaning and a polarity of function.
In this respect, this polarity is unique among the five pairs of polarities that I include within the
Polarities of Democracy.
Specifically, when the participation-representation polarity is managed effectively, an upside of
representation is to serve as a process whereby the individual’s ability to engage in participation is
strengthened and/or regenerated. In this case, representation serves as a polarity of function, a means
by which participation is achieved. Yet in some cases, in order to fulfill its role as a polarity of
function, representation will be found to be the opposite of participation, whereby it will allow for an
individual’s disengagement from the participatory process, thereby providing the individual the needed
time for regeneration of participatory inclination and ability. In this circumstance, while remaining a
polarity of function, representation also takes on a polarity of meaning.
Thus, in Section 1 of this chapter I explore the characteristics, upsides, and downsides of
participation and representation as the fifth and final pair of polarities within the Polarities of
Democracy model. Then, in Section 2, I first use the questions that I drew from Johnson (1996) in
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Chapter 2 to examine a) whether or not a polarity relationship exists for participation and
representation, and b) if so, the extent to which the polarity conforms to the expectations of Johnson’s
model. I then examine the interrelationship of participation and representation with the other elements
of the Polarities of Democracy model.
Section 1. The Characteristics, Upsides, and Downsides of
Participation and Representation
Participation vs. Representation
In introducing the participation-representation polarity, I have presented representation as a
polarity of function for participation, a necessary means to enable participation to flourish. In this
view, participation is presented as an essential element of democratic theory, and certainly it is one of
the elements most consistently identified in general and workplace democracy literature as an essential
element of democracy. Yet, there are those who challenge this concept, and I address their concerns
first.
As I noted in Chapter 1, Young (2002) views representative forms of democracy as necessary not
only for nations or large organizations, but also for neighborhoods and workplaces. At the same time,
Young supports my position that participation is also necessary for the effective functioning of
democracy. But there are theorists who elevate representation to a level wherein it becomes Athe
distinctive feature of democracy@ as noted disdainfully by Pateman (1970, p. 4). Schumpeter (1943),
Berelson (1952), and Dahl (1956) are among those advocating this point of view, in which democracy
is thought of as only method and the concept that democracy serves as an ideal (such as my contention
that the purpose of democracy is to overcome oppression) is rejected.
Pateman (1970) tells us that, beginning with Schumpeter in 1943, an entire school of theorists
emerged who have led a significant debate within the field of political science as to the role of
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participation as an element of democracy. They have argued that participation (other than voting)
should not play a significant role in the democratic process. This school of thought believes that the
limitation on participation is necessary in order to ensure stability of the community. Their argument is
that significant participation invites chaos because they believe that many (if not most) citizens do not
have the capacity to participate on complex issues in an informed way. In this school of thought,
participation is linked more with totalitarianism than democracy. Pateman (1970) reports that much of
the thinking which informs this point of view arose from very real concerns: AThe collapse of the
Weimar Republic, with its high rates of mass participation, into fascism, and the post-war
establishment of totalitarian regimes based on mass participation, albeit participation backed by
intimidation and coercion@ (p. 2).
In Schumpeter’s (1943) view ADemocracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of
institutional arrangement for arriving at political-legislative and administrative-decisions@ (p. 243).
Thus, Pateman (1970) tells us that Schumpeter saw democracy as Aa theory unassociated with any
particular ideals or ends@ (p. 3). Interestingly, as is discussed later in this chapter, Schumpeter’s view
of democracy as a means without ends coincides precisely with that of Mason (1982), who, despite this
similar starting point, comes to an opposite conclusion: that the only defining element of democracy is
participation.
Pateman (1970) labels the arguments of those in the anti-participation school as Athe contemporary
theory of democracy@ (p. 13). She also tells us that, despite the origins of their opposition to
participation arising from their association of it with totalitarianism, at least one proponent of this
school incongruently comes to the conclusion that a stable democracy requires a governmental pattern
that has a Ahealthy element of authoritarianism@ (Eckstein, 1966, p. 262).
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Within the contemporary school of thought, participation is viewed only as playing a limited roll;
that is, of ensuring the protection of Athe private interests of each citizen@ (Pateman, 1970, p. 20).
Pateman tells us that those supporting the contemporary theory of democratic participation base their
position on the rejection of a supposed classical theory, without providing citations to back up their
interpretation of this supposed classical theory. Pateman debunks the classical theory (as presented by
the contemporaries) as a myth and provides citations to show that the classicists’ ideas were much
deeper than how they are portrayed by the contemporaries.
Pateman acknowledges that such classicists as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill did provide
descriptions of participation that can reasonably be described as conforming to the protectionist views
of participation expressed by Schumpeter and the other contemporaries. However, she finds that the
reason for this is that AMill and Bentham are concerned almost entirely with the national ‘institutional
arrangements’ of the political system@ (p. 19). Pateman tells us that within their construct: AThe
participation of the people has a very narrow function; it ensures that good government, i.e.
‘government in the universal interest’, is achieved through the sanction of loss of office.@
Pateman (1970) goes on to point out that there are other classicists, such as Rousseau and John
Stuart Mill, who provide a competing and more robust version of participation. She refers to these
theorists as Atheorists of participatory democracy@ (p. 20). For these theorists, Aparticipation has far
wider functions and is central to the establishment and maintenance of a democratic polity, the latter
being regarded not just as a set of national representative institutions but what I shall call a
participatory society.@
Participation
I turn now to my examination of participation as an essential element of the Polarities of
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Democracy model wherein my view of participation is in juxtaposition with the contemporary theories
of Schumpeter and is consistent with the work of Rousseau, J. S. Mill, and Pateman. I begin with my
assertion that participation is a human right and go on to explore upsides associated with three
interrelated functions that participation serves, particularly in terms of workplace democracy: a)
providing worker control of decision-making; b) providing a learning process; and c) impacting human
development. In this examination, I am describing participatory systems in which workers have
meaningful and effective participation. This should not be confused with pseudo-participatory systems
(described by Bernstein, 1976; Verba, 1961; Selener, 1997, among others) in which organizations seek
only to create the perception that workers are participating, while real decision-making power remains
in the hands of management.
Participation as a Human Right
While I have specified Human Rights as one of the elements of the Polarities of Democracy
model, each of the other elements of the Polarities of Democracy (as I noted in Chapter 6) entails both
rights and obligations, but they are separated out because of two factors: a) their prominence within the
literature; or b) both rights and obligations accrue to each side of the specific polarity. For example,
while participation certainly should be viewed as a human right that must be guaranteed, Bernstein
(1976) nevertheless sets it apart as a separate element of his model of workplace democratization. As I
do with the Polarities of Democracy, Bernstein presents worker participation as such a major element
of workplace democratization that it must have its own place in addition to the general category of
human rights. Also providing support for the concept of participation as a human right is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Article 23 (4) states AEveryone has the right to form and to join
trade unions for the protection of his [sic] interests@ (p. 5). This certainly implies that worker
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participation is indeed a human right.
Pateman (1970) explores the ways in which participatory theorists view participation as essential
for humans exercising control over their own lives and their world. Thus, if participation is essential
for attaining control over our lives, and if one of the purposes of democracy is to allow people
(particularly workers) to gain control over their lives, then participation that enables worker control
can be seen as an essential element of workplace democracy and as a human right.
Melman (2001) provides more specificity to the concept of worker control by presenting worker
participation in decision making as a human right. Thus, Melman asserts that decisions about
technology must be made in the interests of the workers and the community (i.e., organizations have
obligations to both workers and to the community). Melman believes that these obligations stem from
the reality that production is a necessary condition to ensure survival of both individuals and society.
Most significantly, Melman argues that workers have a right to participate in decision-making through
workplace democracy because the failure to do so ensures the continued Ainattention to occupational
illness@ (p. 404) such as the devastating problems afflicting workers in the US through the Aepidemic of
repetitive strain injuries.@
Ellerman (1990) also concurs that worker participation in decision-making is a human right. He
states: ADecision-making capacity is de facto inalienable. A person cannot in fact alienate his or her
decision-making capacity....’Deciding to do as one is told’ is only another way of deciding what to do@
(p. 65). Poole (1975) adds that worker participation is: Athe most appropriate solution to the problems
of alienation in modern industrial societies@ (p. 3). Similarly, Melman (2001) views participation in
decision-making as an inalienable right that lies at the heart of the struggle for workplace democracy.
Melman states AAs I argue throughout this study, workers have struggled constantly to create and
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operate an alternative, a disalienated form of decision-making that is at the core of workplace
democracy@ (p. 13). Melman goes on to place this struggle in an historical context:
The installation of the employment relation introduced new rules for the decision-making and
producing occupations, and defined much of the change from feudalism to capitalism. So, too, the
introduction of worker decision-making as the guiding principle of production will be the crucial
element in a transformation from capitalism to workplace democracy. (p. 393)
Starting from this premise of worker participation in decision-making as a human right, I now
examine the upsides and downsides of participation. As will be seen throughout this section, the
upsides of participation accrue to both the individual worker and the organization (or the community)
as a whole.
Participation: Providing Worker Control of Decision-Making
One of the earliest researchers in the area of workplace democracy, Bernstein (1976) defines
participation as worker control; specifically Ameaningful participation in decision-making is
consistently available to each member (at least within his [sic] area of competence and concern)@ (p.
9). Further support for the concept of participation as worker control comes from Karasek and
Theorell’s (1990) Demand-Control model that demonstrates the extent to which workers require
control over their jobs in order to reduce occupational stress. Shapiro (1999) adds that those who have
the most at stake have the greatest claim to the right to participation. Consequently, he recognizes that
one of the most significant challenges for participation is to Acome up with decision rules that can
reconcile the purposes of different activities with the best possible democratic control of the power
relations that structure them@ (p. 237).
Thus, the challenge becomes ensuring that participation achieves worker control of the decision247

making process. As noted above, Mason (1982) defines workplace democracy solely in terms of
participation (contrary to my position). He ascribes no other values to democracy, other than to the
extent that they promote participation. He believes that the term democracy has been greatly
misunderstood and appropriated by many theorists who are patently un-democratic. He believes that no
nation has attained the democratic ideal; thus he finds that, as noted in Chapter 1, Ademocracy cannot
be viewed as synonymous with any nation, nor can any nation serve as a normative standard against
which others are judged@ (p. 28). He adds that worker participation must be Awidespread and effective@
(p. 26) particularly as it relates to decision making. Mason further defines Awidespread and effective@
by stipulating five dimensions of participation: Aextensity, scope, mode, intensity, and quality@ (p.
154). But this brings up the contradiction in Mason’s position. Since Mason has limited workplace
democracy only to the concept of participation, and since effective participation in decision making is
only possible with equality of access to information by all, it appears that his concept of democracy
must embrace other elements such as equality.
Similarly, Karasek and Theorell (1990) join Mason (1982) in defining workplace participation as
effective and meaningful participation in the decision making process. However, they also somewhat
confuse the issue by both distancing themselves from workplace democracy (as described in Chapter
1) while equating participation in the decision making process with worker control, a concept that
appears to require all of the elements contained within the Polarities of Democracy model. In this vein,
they point out that (as noted elsewhere) AThe primary work-related risk factor [for occupational stress]
appears to be lack of control over how one meets the job’s demands and how one uses one’s skills@ (p.
9). They go on to show that: AIn many cases, elevation of risk with a demanding job appears only when
these demands occur in interaction with low control on the job.@ Yet they do not address all of the
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other elements within the Polarities of Democracy, each of which appears to be related to the issue of
worker control (e.g., my freedom-authority polarity, the effective management of which addresses
imbalances of power within the workplace - a factor that significantly impacts the issue of meaningful
worker control).
Expanding on the meaning of effective participation in decision-making, Blake and Mouton
(1987) describe it as decisions that result in Aunderstanding and agreement@ (p. 89). In their definition,
decision-making is seen as reaching the soundest outcome rather than reaching the outcome desired by
whoever has the most power. Yet they do not suggest a mechanism (other than employer good will)
through which disparate levels of power may be controlled.
Melman (2001) does offer such a mechanism and provides further elaboration on the concept of
effective participation in decision making. Reporting on the APartnership Agreement@ (p. 296) forged
by the Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Company and its unions, Melman finds that: Athe most striking
feature of the agreement is its emphasis on the importance of consensus decision-making.@ He further
notes that AAgreement on the use of consensus method by management and union bears upon every
aspect of worker and management decision-making, for it constitutes a recognition of the union as a
co-equal power.@ Interestingly, consensus decision-making is an essential element of Blake and
Mouton’s (1987) collaborative leadership style. The difference is that with Blake and Mouton,
implementation of the consensus decision-making process remains a prerogative of management that
can always be taken away. The contractual partnership reported on by Melman overcomes the
disparate power of management versus worker by creating a contractual obligation that must be
fulfilled.
But if participation means worker control of the decision-making process, then there are
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significant upsides not just for the workers but for the organizations as well. Among the upsides of
participation in decision-making, Mason (1982) sees the development of better decisions and notes that
this has been recognized as far back as Aristotle. However, Mason continues to ignore the importance
of other elements of a democratic system which go into making participation in decision making an
equitable process, in which all voices are heard and decisions are reached on the basis of the soundest
arguments, not who has the most power. Mason avoids considering that other elements are necessary
for democracy by providing the generalization that participation must be widespread and effective. But
(as noted above) other essential elements of democracy (e.g. diversity-equality, freedom-authority) are
required to enable participation to be widespread and effective.
Melman (2001) explores extensive research that lends support to the idea that one of the upsides of
worker participation in decision-making is that it leads to better decisions, and thus, to Aincreased
productivity@ (p. 250). In several studies of companies engaged in production, Melman reports that:
What is striking is that the nature of the operations performed is unaltered, as is the design of the
machines. What is changed is the maintenance attention given by the production workers to the
operation of machines, the care given to the adjustment of the machines and worker attention to
uncovering and correcting sources of possible defects. (p. 425)
Schweickart (2002) joins in reporting on the extensive research linking worker participation in
decision making with increased productivity. He goes on to add that: Aparticipation is most conducive
to enhancing productivity when combined with profit sharing [consistent with the findings of
Bernstein, 1976], guaranteed long-range employment, relatively narrow wage differentials, and
guaranteed worker rights (such as protection from dismissal except for just cause)@ (p. 60).
Providing further support for the idea that worker participation in decision-making benefits both
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the worker and the organization, Karasek and Theorell (1990) examine job redesign among health care
workers and report that: Aincreasing the participatory decision-making responsibilities of lower-level
staff workers increased their morale substantially and promoted more individualized patterns of patient
care which, again, increase the patients’ own capabilities to manage their illness@ (p. 198). This leads
Karasek and Theroell to Arecommend changes like this [increasing worker participation in decisionmaking] as a strategy to reduce the conventional economic costs of health care--a strategy that could
both improve output (patient health) and improve the well-being of health care professionals.@ Karasek
and Theroell thus conclude that worker participation in decision-making benefits the organization
because: Aworkers have essential information about the actual operation of the system that may never
be reflected in the aggregated and structured data bases reviewed by management. This information is
vital to productivity@ (p. 275).
An additional upside for the organization from worker participation in decision-making is
presented by Pateman (1970). She notes the increased extent to which Aindividuals will conscientiously
accept@ (p. 27) decisions that have been Aarrived at through a participatory decision-making process.@
The extent to which such a participatory decision-making process can contribute to both worker
satisfaction and organizational excellence also has been extensively articulated by Blake and Mouton
(1987).
Finally, Karasek and Theorell (1990) believe that an additional upside of participation (when
defined as worker control of the decision-making process) may be to: Aoffset the negative impact of the
job change process itself, often to a significant degree. Thus, if an inevitable stressor in modern society
is industrial change, then an effective antidote may be participation in decision making at the
workplace@ (p. 186).
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Participation as an Educational Process
Pateman (1970) notes that the participation of individual citizens in decision making Ahas a
psychological effect on the participants, ensuring that there is a continuing interrelationship between
the working of institutions and the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals interacting
within them@ (p. 22). Thus, Pateman believes it is the educative function of participation itself that
gives the individual the capacity for further participation. This educative function extends to learning
the ways in which public and private interests are linked.
Further, the concerns raised by Schumpeter and the other contemporary school advocates
regarding the supposed incompetence of most people can be addressed by the use of participation as an
experiential educational methodology. The extent to which there actually is a downside of participation
brought about by the involvement of unqualified individuals in the decision making process is best
addressed not by excluding those individuals from that process but by improving their abilities through
successful practice of the participatory process. Indeed, Almond and Verba’s (1963) research supports
the idea that participatory democratic experiences in non-governmental settings (such as the
workplace) contribute to a sense of political competence in the societal democracy realm. Likewise,
Poole (1975) states that worker participation in the decision making process is Athe best method of
facilitating the development of socially aware and public-spirited people@ (p. 3).
Thus, developing adult education practices that can improve the capacity of workers to participate
effectively in the decision making process (as I return to in Chapter 8) can play a significant role in
preparing workers for participation within society. However, as Blake and Mouton (1987) have
demonstrated, while providing such individual skill development is essential for enabling workers to
effectively participate, it is not sufficient. Also required are adult education practices that have the
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capacity to address the barriers of organizational structure and processes. For this purpose, Blake and
Mouton provide exemplary methods that can lead to behavioral changes on the part of those who hold
the power that can thwart meaningful participation and instead provide only the token experiences of
pseudo-participation. Yet, even these adult education practices may prove insufficient if those who
hold the power choose not to pursue such opportunities. Once again, adult education practices applied
to social movement efforts become essential in order to work towards the structural changes that are
required to ensure legitimate opportunities for participation; so that even those who are otherwise
unwilling to create meaningful opportunities for participation find that they are required to provide
such processes.
Mason (1982) also believes that active participation in one realm contributes to active
participation in other realms. Further, he argues that participation in workplace decision making offers
the best practice for participation in the governmental process because the workplace most closely
approximates the political realm, in terms of the five dimensions of participation spelled out by Mason
(i.e., extensity, scope, mode, intensity, and quality). This leads Mason to conclude that Adevolving
decision making to the lowest level at which issues can be resolved@ (p. 165) is essential if workers are
to become effective not only in societal democracy, but also in workplace democracy at the higher
levels of the organization. Further, Mason believes that AThrough the experience of participation in the
workplace, the least participatory members of our society will receive training in participation, training
they do not receive elsewhere@ (p. 193). To the extent that this happens, workplace democracy can be a
powerful tool for generating societal participation among those who, as Mason notes, can: Asend a
message to government different from the one it is accustomed to hearing.@ However, Mason fails to
account for the problem that those members of society who are the least participative in government
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may be the most likely to be unemployed and therefore the least likely to benefit from increased
worker participation.
Adding to the concept that practice in participation at the workplace prepares workers to be
participants in societal democracy, Lewis (1986) tells us that Ait is the direct participation of people in
guiding their own immediate affairs [in the workplace] which gives them the competence to control
and judge their representatives’ actions@ (p. 5).
Karasek and Theorell (1990) point out that their research indicates that participation in the
decision making process is an essential ingredient in the learning process. For example, they state: AIn
our model, learning occurs in situations that require both individual psychological energy expenditure
(demands or challenges) and...decision-making capability. As the individual...chooses how best to cope
with a new stressor, that new behavior...will be learned@ (p. 92). Karasek and Theorell (1990) not only
note the importance of workplace participation as a predictor of societal participation, they also ask:
AAnd what about consumers whose leisure is too passive to require consumption of the products of our
modern economy? Passive jobs may simply not support an active economy@ (p. 54), thus further
highlighting the benefits of worker participation not only for the workers but also for the organization
and society as a whole.
However, Pateman (1970) links the learning properties of participation with worker control of
decision making. She reminds us that an:
Individual’s (politically relevant) attitudes will depend to a large extent on the authority
structure of his [sic] work environment...Specifically, the development of a sense of political
efficacy does appear to depend on whether his [sic] work situation allows him [sic] any scope
to participate in decision making.@ (p. 53)
254

Participation and Human Development
I next examine the relationship between participation and human development. I approach this
examination from three perspectives: a) participation’s relationship to development of the individual;
b) participation’s relationship to development of the community; and c) participation’s relationship to
development of the human species.
Karasek and Theorell (1990) point out that the findings from the research on workplace
democratization conducted in Scandinavia may Aindicate an important mechanism by which more
control [participation in decision-making] at work may reduce job stress: increased worker selfconfidence and self-esteem@ (p. 255). This increase in worker self-confidence and self-esteem should
support the workers’ embracing of freedom as specified by Fromm (1941/1965). While the primary
upside of this relationship is of benefit to the individual worker, both the organization and society
should benefit from: a) the reduced costs of treatment stemming from the decreasing rate of
occupational stress; and b) the increased productivity that should accompany that reduction in
occupational stress.
Poole (1975) believes that participation in decision-making can serve Aas a means of overcoming
major social disadvantages which are consequent upon non-democratic modes of decision-making@ (p.
3). Again, the primary beneficiary of this relationship is the individual, yet there is also a benefit for
the organization and society (e.g., increased productivity, increased buying power, decreased crime).
Another upside of participation, noted by many including Maslow (1954), Aristotle (1961), and
Rawls (1971/1999), is that it generates a desire within the individual to seek higher levels of
involvement. Rawls has labeled this Athe Aristotelian Principle@ (p. 377) and tells us that Awhenever a
person engages in an activity belonging to some [hierarchical] chain...he [sic] tends to move up the
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chain. In general, he [sic] will prefer doing the nth to doing the n-1th activity.@ In a related vein, Poole
(1975) sees worker participation serving as Aa stepping-stone to the fulfillment of certain ‘higher
echelons’ of needs which are deemed to be common to all men [sic]@ (p. 3).
In terms of community development, Pateman (1970) postulates that participation serves as an
Aintegrative function;...it increases the feeling among individual citizens that they ‘belong’ in their
community@ (p. 27). Again, Blake and Mouton (1987) have provided extensive research demonstrating
that this increased feeling of being part of a community applies to the workplace, where a genuine
participatory decision-making process generates increased worker commitment to the organization.
Mason (1982), drawing on Rousseau and John Stuart Mill, joins in the idea that participation serves to
establish and strengthen the sense of community. Yet, once again, Mason’s own views are
contradictory to his argument that participation, regardless of the outcome, is the only test of
democracy. Unless the individual’s commitment to the common good is seen as an essential element of
democracy (as in the Polarities of Democracy model) why does Mason believe that helping to develop
that commitment should be considered an upside of participation? While Mason states that
participation is the only defining element of democracy, all of his arguments articulate a vision of
democracy that is broader than mere participation. In all cases, the good effects that Mason attributes
to participation appear to be consistent with the presence of some other essential element of
democracy.
Karasek and Theorell (1990) find a further upside to participation in terms of the social interaction
that it generates. Their research reveals that group interaction has a positive effect on both the
individual and the work environment. For example, they state AAs work conditions...are reported to
employers not by individuals but rather by groups of individuals, people lose their fear of self256

deficiency and begin to develop a vocabulary to articulate the causes of their work-related problems@
(p. 210). Unfortunately, Karasek and Theorell also note that such workplace participation is not the
norm within the US culture. Rather, they find that such jobs as: Aassemblers and machine operatives...
keypunch operators and telephone operators...more clearly than any other [jobs] represent the
automated, machine-paced worker on the assembly line; they embody Taylor’s job design principles@
(p. 74). Karasek and Theorell label these workers the Aisolated prisoner@ and report that: AThis
combination of psychological characteristics appears to have no clear analogue in most animal
societies and there is evidence that such jobs represent a clear sociobiological misfit with human
physiological capabilities.@
This difference between the human species and other animals leads to the more general question
of the relationship of participation to the evolution of the human species. Mason (1982) views effective
participation as human action that is purposeful and linked to the realization of human potential. In this
sense his view is consistent with my view of human agency contributing to the positive evolution of
the human species. Also consistent with my assumptions as specified in Chapter 1, Mason (1982) sees
the elements associated with democracy stemming from both our selfish and altruistic tendencies.
Once again, however, his view of democracy appears to be more consistent with a broader concept of
democracy than with the value-free notion of participation that he ostensibly supports. For example, he
presents his view of participatory democracy as having:
A different view of man’s [sic] nature; liberal democracy [as articulated by Locke] depicts man
[sic] largely as self-interested, acquiring, and manipulative; participatory democracy views man
[sic] in a much more favorable light, stressing his [sic] ability to conceive of and maintain
communities through his [sic] sincere empathy with other people. It conceives of the proper set
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of institutions differently; liberal democracy seeks to fashion governmental institutions into a
representative form and allow other institutions to favor the free acquisition of property;
participatory democracy departs from the simple utilitarian view of institutions and
communities and seeks to open them full to popular participation. Finally, it differs as to the
proper view of the good life. Liberal democracy stresses acquiring almost exclusively
individualistic values; participatory democracy in addition stresses the value of life shared in
common with others. (p. 56)
O’Manique (2003) goes even farther. For him, participation is an essential element in the survival
of our species. He specifies participation as human agency, which he argues is responsible for the
formation of our human cultures which, through human consciousness, now provide the ability to
control our evolutionary process. Yet, O’Manique recognizes that participation, in the form of human
agency, can only contribute to our human development if our actions are based on sound information
and an understanding of Athe origins from which we have evolved@ (p. 111), thus drawing on both the
decision-making and learning process relationships of participation.

The Downsides of Participation
One of the most significant downsides of participation is the possibility that the individual can
become overwhelmed, worn-out, and ultimately disengaged and apathetic. For example, Mason (1982)
states that one of the downsides of participation is that it can overwhelm the individual by being allconsuming. He acknowledges that Athe purest imaginable democracy is no more desirable than it is
possible@ (p. 30). But, because Mason equates democracy only with participation, he offers no way to
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specify the appropriate level of participation. In contrast, viewing participation and representation as
polarities offers us a way to seek the upsides of each while eliminating the downsides.
Karasek and Theorell (1990) note that there can be potential downsides of worker participation in
decisions about work procedures, if those workers do not have either the opportunity for interaction
with other workers or some activity that would provide a regenerative polarity. Karasek and Theorell
report that the AU.S. version of just-in-time assembly production is not really a participative, team
approach@ (p. 266). Rather, they tell us it is one in which AAll parts of the system are pushed to peak
performance.@ So, Karasek and Theorell find that AWhile workers...have power to alter work routines
in cooperative conferences, they must adhere to these adopted procedures rigidly.@ Therfore, Karasek
and Theorell conclude that Awhile these jobs would appear to be enriched and ‘active’ they are instead
reported as stressful...new job designs where tasks have been packed in, with no opportunity for rest
breaks.@
Bernstein’s (1976) research also supports the idea that there can be a downside to Aoverparticipation@ (p. 61). He found that even among the firms that he researched in which advanced
democratization had occurred, they realized that when workers became involved in every decision, no
matter how consequential, it had Ataken up too much of their time...[and] was also reducing their
decision-making, as a firm, below optimum@. Shapiro (1999) concurs that participation can require so
much time as to become unreasonable.
Bernstein’s (1976) research finds that even in firms with advanced democratization (such as the
plywood manufacturing cooperatives in the States of Oregon and Washington in the US) there are still
varying levels of participation. He reports that they Aexhibit a gradation in participation and political
maturity somewhat like that reported by political scientists for political democracies in general: a
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proportion of activists, a proportion of ‘occasionals,’and a proportion of ‘apathetics’@ (p. 17).
However, for these advanced cases of democratization, Bernstein reports that Athe ‘occasional’ and
‘apathetic’ categories seem much smaller than what has been reported about national politics, and the
active participants’ category seems significantly larger.@
Saul (1995) notes a downside of participation in such processes as referenda and direct
democracy, which actually divert us from the real issues affecting our lives. He tells us that AThe
modern referendum, as Napoleon understood when he invented it, is the ideal consummation of the
rational as irrational, of the anti-democratic posing as democracy@ (p. 113). Saul goes on to say: Aboth
the referendum and direct democracy are a happy marriage with corporatism. The complex, real
questions are dealt with behind the scenes....As for the citizenry, they are occupied and distracted by
the fireworks of their direct involvement.@
As noted above, while I believe that his responses are inappropriate, Schumpeter (1943) has
identified very real downsides of participation. Certainly history teaches us that participation has the
potential to take the form of violence and mob behavior.
Finally, Fromm (1941/1965) finds a downside of participation in the: Atrait which became so
prominent in Calvinism; the development of frantic activity and a striving to do something@ (p. 111).
Fromm states that: AActivity in this sense assumes a compulsory quality: the individual has to be active
in order to overcome his [sic] feeling of doubt and powerlessness.@
Representation
In contrast to those theorists like Schumpeter (1943) who place representation as the key element
of democracy while shunning participation, Barber (1984) describes those arguments that reject
representation as an element of democracy. But Young (2002) provides ample arguments for
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considering participation and representation as paired elements of democracy. She concludes that
Arepresentation and participation are not alternatives in an inclusive cummunicative democracy, but
require each@ (p. 132).
Representation as Regeneration
Perhaps the most significant upside of representation is that it can provide the regenerative process
required to enable individuals to participate in the democratic process at the highest possible level. For
example, regeneration is grounded in the workplace democracy literature as a scientific and
physiological requirement for the human body to be able to perform at peak levels. While Karasek and
Theorell (1990) admit that because of the scarcity of the literature their Ahypotheses in this area
[regeneration and worker health in the workplace] must therefore be speculative@ (p. 107); they
nevertheless assert: Athe importance of this activity [physical regeneration] is attested to by the sheer
volume of cell regeneration that is known to occur.@
Another upside of representation that arises from its regenerative aspects (to the extent that it
addresses the downside of participation that may lead to exhaustion) is that it may allow for improved
human interaction. Karasek and Theorell (1990) note the need for relaxed social interaction. In
examining the failure of modern work environments to provide such opportunities, they observe:
What seems to be missing in the modern world is relaxed affiliative behavior, such as the
grooming activities displayed in other mammals. This difference, along with the discrepancy between
demands and control, seems to be the source of a major potential misfit between human physiology
and modern social institutions. (p. 97)
An additional upside of the regeneration that can accompany representation is provided by Fromm
(1941/1965) who, as noted above, found a downside of participation in the frantic, meaningless
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activity arising from feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness. It may be that an upside of
regenerative representation, to the extent it allows workers to effectively participate in decisionmaking (which, as reported by Karasek and Theorell, 1990, can dramatically increase their power and
self-esteem), may contribute to the development of the workers’ self-confidence, a condition that
Fromm believes can contribute to workers embracing their freedom and realizing their human
potential.
Also, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) lends support to the idea that
regeneration is a human right. Article 24 states: AEveryone has the right to rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay@ (p. 5). Thus, to the extent that
representation is necessary to allow the regeneration of participatory inclinations, representation itself
may be seen as a human right.
Representation as Legitimation
Representation can provide the rules and structure to ensure that everyone’s voice can be heard
and considered. Absent formal representative fora, Young (2002) reminds us that it is not always the
wisest but often the loudest voice that dominates. Thus, Pitkin (1971) describes representation as
including both authorization and accountability.
In this sense, representation can, as Young (2002) tells us, address the Acomplex realities of
democratic process...the web of modern social life [that] ties the action of some people and institutions
in one place to consequences in many other places and institutions.@ (p. 124). Absent this upside of
representation, democratic practice that relied only on face-to-face participation would be unthinkable
for any activity of broad scale.
Further, Young (2002) notes that representation, if effectively structured, can ensure that
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marginalized racial minority groups and/or classes can be assured of the representation that they may
be denied through the exertion of power by privileged elites. These structural upsides of representation
can be achieved through such means as providing Aquotas for women in party lists@ (p. 150) or
Aproportional representation@ (p. 152).
Representation and the Workplace
For Melman (2001) representation (in the form of unions) is the essential ingredient for workplace
democracy. In the workplace, representation could; a) overcome the downsides of participation such as
exhaustion and the resultant apathy; b) provide workers with increased abilities to participate in worker
control of decision making; c) contribute to the workers’ capacity for learning and growth (this is
especially important as a polarity management tool to enhance the quality of participation beyond the
level feared by Schumpeter); d) contribute to the self-confidence and self esteem of workers; and e)
contribute to the capacity of workers to embrace commitments to the organization and the community.
The Downsides of Representation
A significant downside of representation is that it may allow the representative to develop
increasingly weak relationships with the represented. The more alienated a representative becomes
from the represented, the less likely the representation will be effective. When this happens, it detracts
from the concept of representation as legitimation.
In addition, in contrast to the potential upside of inclusion for marginalized groups, it is possible
that the opposite situation may occur. Representative forms of governance may reproduce the
marginalization of groups, and foster an imposition of elite beliefs and decisions on the body politic,
whether societal or workplace.
In all of these instances, these downsides of representation may lead to a further downside, the
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lack of participation. Young (2002) tells us AWhen representatives become too separated, constituents
lose the sense that they have influence over policy-making, become disaffected, and withdraw their
participation@ (p. 132).
Having explored the upsides and downsides of participation and representation, I now explore the
extent of their polarity relationship. I do so by moving to Section 2, where I use the questions that I
drew from Johnson (1996) in Chapter 2 to examine a) whether or not a polarity relationship exists, and
b) if so, the extent to which the polarity conforms to the expectations of Johnson’s model.
Section 2. The Polarity Relationship of Participation and Representation
Analysis of Participation and Representation
in Relation to the Polarity Management Concept
To analyze the polarity relationship of participation and representation, I now turn to the questions
drawn from Johnson (1996) in Chapter 2 to examine: a) whether or not a polarity relationship exists;
and b) if so, the extent to which the polarity conforms to the expectations of Johnson’s model.
1. Johnson (1996) asks “is the difficulty ongoing?” (p. 81). Yes. The question of how much
participation is appropriate, particularly from the standpoint of how much participation a person can
engage in without becoming exhausted, overwhelmed, or apathetic, is not one that can be answered on
a universal basis. Each individual possesses varying capacities for participation, and however strong
those varying capacities might be, there will always be a need for some process to provide legitimate
representation for the individual when the individuals capacity for participation is exceeded.
2. Johnson (1996) asks “are there two poles which are interdependent?” (p. 81). Yes. Participation
absent representation may become overwhelming and thus devolve to apathy. Or, it can lead to the
type of frenzied activity described by Fromm (1941/1965). Or, it can degenerate into the kind of mass
hysteria feared by Schumpeter (1943). As for representation, because it is primarily a polarity of
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function, it is necessary as a means to both enable participation by the individual at the highest level
possible, while ensuring that the interests of the individual are represented when it is impossible for the
individual to directly participate. However, there certainly are downsides to representative activities
that could serve as the regenerative polarity of function for participation, but fail to serve in that
function because of the absence of participation. For example, without participation as the polarity to
representation, relaxation activities that might otherwise bring about regeneration can easily slip into
apathy. Consistent with this observation, Bernstein (1976) has found that when participation is lacking
in the workplace, you wind up with apathetic workers. Apathy is one of the downsides of
representation (when it fails to perform as a polarity of function for participation). In this case, apathy
(a potential downside of representation) is related to the absence of participation (in effect, the opposite
of the upside of participation which is more inclined to generate commitment). Thus, apathy can arise
from too much participation absent representation, or from activities that could be regenerative but are
not because of the lack of participation. In fact, participation itself can be regenerative if is particularly
successful (and for some individuals, even unsuccessful participation only serves to regenerate their
activities). Particularly because they are primarily polarities of function, neither participation nor
representation (or at least representation activities that could be regenerative and/or that also provide
legitimate representation for the interests of the individual when direct participation is not possible)
works well without the other.
3. Johnson (1996) details three generic polarities (part and whole, self and other, doing and being).
Is the polarity consistent with one of Johnson’s generic polarities? Yes. In this case participation and
representation are primarily a doing-being polarity. Participation is the ideal and representation should
be the process through which continued participation is possible, while also providing legitimate
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representation for the individual when direct participation is not possible. However, as noted above,
sometimes participation and representation also are a polarity of meaning, as when representation
allows for forms of regeneration that include non-participative relaxation or disengagement that
restores or increases the ability of the worker to engage in further participation.
4. When a polarity exists (as opposed to a solution to be found), Johnson (1996) visualizes his
model of polarities as embracing four quadrants with each pole having upsides and downsides. Are
there upsides and downsides? Yes. This chapter has specified upsides and downsides of participation
and representation. But, if the results of representation actually serve to isolate the individual, (such as
through non-participative relaxation or disengagement) then it is possible that representation may lead
to apathy. Further, a potential downside of representation may be the loss of the interests of the
individual.
5. Johnson (1996) says “the ongoing goal in Polarity Management is to stay in the upper two
quadrants as much as possible” (p. 81). Is the goal of this polarity to stay in the upper two quadrants?
Yes. The downsides of participation (e.g., exhaustion, apathy) should be avoided and it is through the
upsides of representation that this can occur. Also, the failure to maintain the upsides of representation
may limit the ability to maintain the upsides of participation.
6. Johnson (1996) says “the clearest opposites...are the downside of one pole and the upside of the
other” (p. 9). Are these the clearest opposites? Yes. Once again, if the downsides of participation
include exhaustion and apathy, then the upsides of representation are clearly the opposite. Also, the
downsides of representation (whether when representation leads to disengagement and apathy or when
it fails to represent the interests of the individual represented) are specifically opposite to the upsides of
participation.
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7. Johnson (1996) says: Whenever there is a push for a shift from one pole of a polarity to the
other, it is because those pushing are: 1) Experiencing or anticipating the downsides of the present pole
which they identify as the ‘problem,’ and, 2) they are attracted to the upsides of the other pole which
they identify as the ‘solution.’ (p. 7)
Is this occurring? Not exactly. In the US the greatest push against participation has come from
those who have perceived its downsides but nevertheless have not embraced the upsides of
representation. Rather, they have chosen to argue against inclusion of participation within the concept
of democracy and have embraced a concept of representation that is limited to the already privileged.
8. Johnson (1996) believes these crusader and tradition-bearing forces both support the positive
aspects of the pole they are espousing and fear the negative aspects of the opposite pole. Is this
occurring? No. Those who oppose participation generally do not espouse the upsides of representation.
Rather they embrace the downsides of representation, limiting representation to the already privileged.
9. When polarities are not recognized and managed, Johnson (1996) maintains that there is a
natural pattern of shifting from one polarity to the other. Eventually (assuming power imbalances do
not prevent it), he indicates that the downsides of the present pole will prove too much, and the
crusaders will be successful in shifting to the opposite pole. The process will then repeat itself, moving
back and forth from one pole to the other and moving from the positive quadrants to the negative
quadrants in an infinity loop configuration. Under these circumstances we never experience the upsides
of both poles simultaneously. Is this occurring? Yes. In the US in particular, the waxing and waning of
support for participation appears to be generated by power differentials (opposition to participation on
the part of those who have the power) rather than by seeking the true upsides of representation. This
situation also is related to the fact that participation and representation are primarily polarities of
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function, and only secondarily polarities of meaning.
10. In the case where an organization or society concentrates on only one pole (such as the case
where there is an overwhelming power imbalance in favor of either the crusaders or tradition-bearers)
Johnson (1996) contends that the upside of that pole is lost and the negative aspects of the pole being
focused on will become stronger (i.e., more time will be spent in the downside quadrant of that pole).
He says: “Over-emphasize one pole for a long time and you get the downside of both poles. Further,
you also tend to lose the benefits [upper quadrants] of both the over emphasized pole and the neglected
pole” (p. 156). Is this occurring? Yes. Since the opponents of participation do so not because they
espouse legitimate representation but because they seek to deny power to others through limiting their
participation, the result is consistent. Lack of participation leads to the powerlessness and apathy that
make a person less able or even willing to seek further opportunities for participation.
11. Johnson (1996) believes “There are two major factors which reduce the crusader’s ability to
see the whole dilemma” (p. 256). He presents the first factor as:
DURATION:
The longer an individual or group experiences one of the lower quadrants, the more attractive
becomes the upper quadrant of the opposite pole and the more difficult it is to see any upside to
the present pole or any downside to the other pole. (p. 256)
Is this occurring? No. For those who have been denied participation (and this applies to most
workers over the centuries) the opposite is more likely to be true. They are less likely to see the upsides
of representation. As for those who overcome this inertia and do see the need for representation, they
nevertheless generally remain committed primarily to the upsides of participation.
12. The second major factor that Johnson (1996) believes will “reduce the crusader’s ability to see
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the whole dilemma” (p. 256) is intensity. He presents this as:
INTENSITY
The more intense the negative experience in a particular lower quadrant, the more powerful is
the crusade to the upside of the opposite pole. Consistent with that, the greater the intensity, the
more difficult it is to see the upside of the present pole and the downside of the “ideal” place to
which one wants to go. When you combine long duration with a high intensity of suffering, the
ability to see all four quadrants is radically impaired. (p. 256)
Is this occurring? Yes. Again, because participation and representation are primarily polarities of
function rather than polarities of meaning, those who are crusaders for participation tend not to be
crusaders for representation, while those who oppose general participation by the most dispossessed,
generally ignore the concept of representation as serving the interests of those who they seek to deny
participation.
13. Johnson (1996) believes “there are two major factors which reduce the tradition-bearer’s
ability to see the whole dilemma” (p. 258). He presents the first factor as:
INSULATION
Those who benefit most from the upside of a particular pole tend to fall out of touch with those
who benefit least and suffer most from the downside of the same pole. The greater the relative
benefits a person or group has from the upside of a pole, the more they will insulate themselves
from downside realities. (p. 258)
Is this occurring? Yes. Those who benefit most from a lack of worker participation generally have
the upsides of participation for themselves. They certainly have fallen out of touch with those who (by
being denied opportunities for participation) benefit the least. Further, they are insulated from the day269

to-day reality of those who are denied opportunities for participation. Also, particularly in the US,
those who benefit from national representation that excludes the interests of the poor have pursued
policies that would further restrict the ability of the poor to participate even in the selection of
representatives.
14. The second major factor that Johnson (1996) believes will “reduce the tradition-bearer’s ability
to see the whole dilemma” (p. 258) is anticipated loss. He defines this as:
ANTICIPATED LOSS
The greater the anticipated loss from getting caught in the downside of the opposite pole, the
more difficult it will be to see the upside of that opposite pole. The combination of insulation
and anticipated loss make it very difficult for tradition-bearers to see the whole polarity. (p.
258)
Is this occurring? Yes. Those who have the power to deny worker participation certainly have lost
sight of the upsides of either pole as it applies to workers. However, they do not seem to have any
difficulty seeing the upsides of participation and representation for themselves. Particularly in the US,
this blindness has now extended to the societal realm, where those in power represent the interests of
the privileged class and seek to further deny participation to the already disenfranchised because the
fear that there will be a more equitable sharing of wealth.
Based on the above analysis, my conclusion is that participation and representation meet the
fundamental criteria for polarities as specified by Johnson (1996). They represent a difficulty that is
ongoing and there are two poles that are interdependent. On one hand, there is a difficulty maintaining
participation at the required level absent some form of representation. On the other hand,
representation that could be regenerative can instead lead to apathy absent either the opportunity for
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participation or representation that serves only the interests of the most powerful. While participation
and representation do not fully conform with the 12 traits anticipated by Johnson, there is enough
conformity that, when combined with the fact that they meet the two fundamental criteria, it is clear
that they are a polarity.
The Interrelationships of Participation and Representation
With The Other Elements of The Polarities of Democracy Model
Rousseau (1983) linked participation with the concept of equality, establishing the essential level
of participation as the ownership of property, in order to ensure that each individual has the resources
to be able to act independently without being subject to the coercion of those with greater resources.
While Rousseau’s advocacy of equality was not absolute, even his stress on relative equality seems
incomprehensible when viewed against the vast inequalities in wealth and power that characterize our
modern world. Yet, as I have explored in other chapters, there are solutions to inequality that can be
pursued through the participation (human agency) of adult educators and of others who seek to
advance democratic concepts. This linkage of participation and equality is also evidenced in the
writing of Cole (1920) and Pateman (1970).
Pateman (1970) tells us that Rousseau also linked participation with issues of freedom and control
and that Athe more fanciful and sinister interpretations that have been placed on@ (p. 25) Rousseau’s
Amost...notorious@ statement concerning forcing people to be free Awould not have been possible if
Rousseau’s concept of freedom had been placed firmly in the context of participation.@ Pateman goes
on to explain that for Rousseau, Athe way in which an individual can be ‘forced’ to be free is part and
parcel of the same process by which he is ‘forcibly’ educated through participating in decision
making.@
As noted above, Karasek and Theorell (1990) suggest that participation in workplace decision271

making may increase worker self-confidence and self-esteem. These are human characteristics that
Fromm (1941/1965) found to be necessary to combat our Afear of freedom@ (p. xii). Thus, opportunities
for participation in workplace decision-making may contribute to our ability to embrace true freedom.
Bernstein (1976) has found that democratization of the workplace includes a feedback loop
between participation and the economic rewards provided to workers. Thus, there is an
interrelationship between participation and the diversity-equality polarity.
Shapiro (1999) finds an interrelationship between participation and justice. He states:
Aparticipation plays a necessary but circumscribed role in ordering social relations justly. Valuable as
democratic participation is in managing the power dimensions of collective activities, it is not the point
of the exercise@ (p. 23).
Shapiro also notes the interrelationship of participation and equality. He argues that corporate
power, when allowed to participate unchecked in the democratic process, results in a decision-making
process that is skewed in favor of corporate wealth and not necessarily in the interest of people.
Poole (1975) points out the interrelationship between participation and equality. He states that it is
necessary for workers to have equal access to the information possessed by managers, in order to
participate effectively in the decision-making process.
As noted in Section 1 above, Schweickart (2002) identified four factors that would enhance the
ability of worker participation in decision-making to increase productivity: profit sharing, guaranteed
long-range employment, relatively narrow wage differentials, and guaranteed worker rights. Thus, he
has directly linked participation, justice, equality, and human rights, each of which are elements
contained within the Polarities of Democracy.
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Conclusion to Chapter 7
In this chapter I have explored the relationship of participation and representation. I have
shown the importance of participation to the concept of workplace (and societal) democracy. I
have identified representation as a polarity of both function and meaning for participation,
particularly to avoid burnout and apathy. I have identified upsides and downsides of both
participation and representation and suggested that the upsides of each benefit individual
workers, the organization, and the community. I have asserted that upsides of both participation
and representation are necessary for both workplace and societal democracy. I have examined
the interdependence of participation and representation, and their consistency with the Polarity
Management concept. Finally, I have shown the complex interrelatedness of the participation and
representation polarity with the other polarity elements contained within the Polarities of
Democracy. This concludes my examination of the five pairs of polarities in the Polarities of
Democracy model. In the next chapter I draw my conclusions regarding the utility of the
Polarities of Democracy.
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